User safety is at the heart of everything we do at Google. Our mission to make technology helpful for everyone means building features that protect you while keeping your privacy top of mind. From Gmail’s defenses that stop more than 99.9% of spam, phishing and malware, to Google Messages’ advanced security that protects users from 2 billion suspicious messages a month and beyond, we’re constantly developing and expanding protection features that help keep you safe.

We’re introducing two new real-time protection features that enhance your safety, all while safeguarding your privacy: Scam Detection in Phone by Google to protect you from scams and fraud, and Google Play Protect live threat detection with real-time alerts to protect you from malware and dangerous apps.

These new security features are available first on Pixel, and are coming soon to more Android devices.

More intelligent AI-powered protection against scams

Scammers steal over $1 trillion dollars a year from people, and phone calls are their favorite way to do it. Even more alarming, scam calls are evolving, becoming increasingly more sophisticated, damaging and harder to identify. That’s why we’re using the best of Google AI to identify and stop scams before they can do harm with Scam Detection.

Real-time protection, built with your privacy in mind.

  • Real-time defense, right on your device: Scam Detection uses powerful on-device AI to notify you of a potential scam call happening in real-time by detecting conversation patterns commonly associated with scams. For example, if a caller claims to be from your bank and asks you to urgently transfer funds due to an alleged account breach, Scam Detection will process the call to determine whether the call is likely spam and, if so, can provide an audio and haptic alert and visual warning that the call may be a scam.
  • Private by design, you’re always in control: We’ve built Scam Detection to protect your privacy and ensure you’re always in control of your data. Scam Detection is off by default, and you can decide whether you want to activate it for future calls. At any time, you can turn it off for all calls in the Phone app Settings, or during a particular call. The AI detection model and processing are fully on-device, which means that no conversation audio or transcription is stored on the device, sent to Google servers or anywhere else, or retrievable after the call.
  • Cutting-edge AI protection, now on more Pixel phones: Gemini Nano, our advanced on-device AI model, powers Scam Detection on Pixel 9 series devices. As part of our commitment to bring powerful AI features to even more devices, this AI-powered protection is available to Pixel 6+ users thanks to other robust Google on-device machine learning models.

We’re now rolling out Scam Detection to English-speaking Phone by Google public beta users in the U.S. with a Pixel 6 or newer device.

To provide feedback on your experience, please click on Phone by Google App -> Menu -> Help & Feedback -> Send Feedback. We look forward to learning from this beta and your feedback, and we’ll share more about Scam Detection in the months ahead.

More real-time alerts to protect you from bad apps

Google Play Protect works non-stop to protect you in real-time from malware and unsafe apps. Play Protect analyzes behavioral signals related to the use of sensitive permissions and interactions with other apps and services.

With live threat detection, if a harmful app is found, you’ll now receive a real-time alert, allowing you to take immediate action to protect your device. By looking at actual activity patterns of apps, live threat detection can now find malicious apps that try extra hard to hide their behavior or lie dormant for a time before engaging in suspicious activity.

At launch, live threat detection will focus on stalkerware, code that may collect personal or sensitive data for monitoring purposes without user consent, and we will explore expanding its detection to other types of harmful apps in the future. All of this protection happens on your device in a privacy preserving way through Private Compute Core, which allows us to protect users without collecting data.

Live threat detection with real-time alerts in Google Play Protect are now available on Pixel 6+ devices and will be coming to additional phone makers in the coming months.

Every day, over a billion people use Google Messages to communicate. That’s why we’ve made security a top priority, building in powerful on-device, AI-powered filters and advanced security that protects users from 2 billion suspicious messages a month. With end-to-end encrypted1 RCS conversations, you can communicate privately with other Google Messages RCS users. And we’re not stopping there. We’re committed to constantly developing new controls and features to make your conversations on Google Messages even more secure and private.

As part of cybersecurity awareness month, we’re sharing five new protections to help keep you safe while using Google Messages on Android:

  1. Enhanced detection protects you from package delivery and job scams. Google Messages is adding new protections against scam texts that may seem harmless at first but can eventually lead to fraud. For Google Messages beta users2, we’re rolling out enhanced scam detection, with improved analysis of scammy texts, starting with a focus on package delivery and job seeking messages. When Google Messages suspects a potential scam text, it will automatically move the message into your spam folder or warn you. Google Messages uses on-device machine learning models to classify these scams, so your conversations stay private and the content is never sent to Google unless you report spam. We’re rolling this enhancement out now to Google Messages beta users who have spam protection enabled.
  2. Intelligent warnings alert you about potentially dangerous links. In the past year, we’ve been piloting more protections for Google Messages users when they receive text messages with potentially dangerous links. In India, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Google Messages warns users when they get a link from unknown senders and blocks messages with links from suspicious senders. We’re in the process of expanding this feature globally later this year.
  3. Controls to turn off messages from unknown international senders. In some cases, scam text messages come from international numbers. Soon, you will be able to automatically hide messages from international senders who are not existing contacts so you don’t have to interact with them. If enabled, messages from international non-contacts will automatically be moved to the “Spam & blocked” folder. This feature will roll out first as a pilot in Singapore later this year before we look at expanding to more countries.
  4. Sensitive Content Warnings give you control over seeing and sending images that may contain nudity. At Google, we aim to provide users with a variety of ways to protect themselves against unwanted content, while keeping them in control of their data. This is why we’re introducing Sensitive Content Warnings for Google Messages.

    Sensitive Content Warnings is an optional feature that blurs images that may contain nudity before viewing, and then prompts with a “speed bump” that contains help-finding resources and options, including to view the content. When the feature is enabled, and an image that may contain nudity is about to be sent or forwarded, it also provides a speed bump to remind users of the risks of sending nude imagery and preventing accidental shares.

    All of this happens on-device to protect your privacy and keep end-to-end encrypted message content private to only sender and recipient. Sensitive Content Warnings doesn’t allow Google access to the contents of your images, nor does Google know that nudity may have been detected. This feature is opt-in for adults, managed via Android Settings, and is opt-out for users under 18 years of age. Sensitive Content Warnings will be rolling out to Android 9+ devices including Android Go devices3 with Google Messages in the coming months.

  5. More confirmation about who you’re messaging. To help you avoid sophisticated messaging threats where an attacker tries to impersonate one of your contacts, we’re working to add a contact verifying feature to Android. This new feature will allow you to verify your contacts’ public keys so you can confirm you’re communicating with the person you intend to message. We’re creating a unified system for public key verification across different apps, which you can verify through QR code scanning or number comparison. This feature will be launching next year for Android 9+ devices, with support for messaging apps including Google Messages.

    These are just some of the new and upcoming features that you can use to better protect yourself when sending and receiving messages. Download Google Messages from the Google Play Store to enjoy these protections and controls and learn more about Google Messages here.

    Notes


    1. End-to-end encryption is currently available between Google Messages users. Availability of RCS varies by region and carrier. 

    2. Availability of features may vary by market and device. Sign up for beta testing and a data plan may be required.  

    3. Requires 2 GB of RAM. 

Janine Roberta Ferreira was driving home from work in São Paulo when she stopped at a traffic light. A man suddenly appeared and broke the window of her unlocked car, grabbing her phone. She struggled with him for a moment before he wrestled the phone away and ran off. The incident left her deeply shaken. Not only was she saddened at the loss of precious data, like pictures of her nephew, but she also felt vulnerable knowing her banking information was on her phone that was just stolen by a thief.

Situations like Janine’s highlighted the need for a comprehensive solution to phone theft that exceeded existing tools on any platform. Phone theft is a widespread concern in many countries – 97 phones are robbed or stolen every hour in Brazil. The GSM Association reports millions of devices stolen every year, and the numbers continue to grow.

With our phones becoming increasingly central to storing sensitive data, like payment information and personal details, losing one can be an unsettling experience. That’s why we developed and thoroughly beta tested, a full suite of features designed to protect you and your data at every stage – before, during, and after device theft.

These advanced theft protection features are now available to users around the world through Android 15 and a Google Play Services update (Android 10+ devices).

AI-powered protection for your device the moment it is stolen

Theft Detection Lock uses powerful AI to proactively protect you at the moment of a theft attempt. By using on-device machine learning, Theft Detection Lock is able to analyze various device signals to detect potential theft attempts. If the algorithm detects a potential theft attempt on your unlocked device, it locks your screen to keep thieves out.

To protect your sensitive data if your phone is stolen, Theft Detection Lock uses device sensors to identify theft attempts. We’re working hard to bring this feature to as many devices as possible. This feature is rolling out gradually to ensure compatibility with various devices, starting today with Android devices that cover 90% of active users worldwide. Check your theft protection settings page periodically to see if your device is currently supported.

In addition to Theft Detection Lock, Offline Device Lock protects you if a thief tries to take your device offline to extract data or avoid a remote wipe via Android’s Find My Device. If an unlocked device goes offline for prolonged periods, this feature locks the screen to ensure your phone can’t be used in the hands of a thief.

If your Android device does become lost or stolen, Remote Lock can quickly help you secure it. Even if you can’t remember your Google account credentials in the moment of theft, you can use any device to visit Android.com/lock and lock your phone with just a verified phone number. Remote Lock secures your device while you regain access through Android’s Find My Device – which lets you secure, locate or remotely wipe your device. As a security best practice, we always recommend backing up your device on a continuous basis, so remotely wiping your device is not an issue.

These features are now available on most Android 10+ devices1 via a Google Play Services update and must be enabled in settings.

Advanced security to deter theft before it happens

Android 15 introduces new security features to deter theft before it happens by making it harder for thieves to access sensitive settings, apps, or reset your device for resale:

  • Changes to sensitive settings like Find My Device now require your PIN, password, or biometric authentication.
  • Multiple failed login attempts, which could be a sign that a thief is trying to guess your password, will lock down your device, preventing unauthorized access.
  • And enhanced factory reset protection makes it even harder for thieves to reset your device without your Google account credentials, significantly reducing its resale value and protecting your data.

Later this year, we’ll launch Identity Check, an opt-in feature that will add an extra layer of protection by requiring biometric authentication when accessing critical Google account and device settings, like changing your PIN, disabling theft protection, or accessing Passkeys from an untrusted location. This helps prevent unauthorized access even if your device PIN is compromised.

Real-world protection for billions of Android users

By integrating advanced technology like AI and biometric authentication, we’re making Android devices less appealing targets for thieves to give you greater peace of mind. These theft protection features are just one example of how Android is working to provide real-world protection for everyone. We’re dedicated to working with our partners around the world to continuously improve Android security and help you and your data stay safe.

You can turn on the new Android theft features by clicking here on a supported Android device. Learn more about our theft protection features by visiting our help center.

Notes


  1. Android Go smartphones, tablets and wearables are not supported 

Pixel phones have earned a well-deserved reputation for being security-conscious. In this blog, we’ll take a peek under the hood to see how Pixel mitigates common exploits on cellular basebands.

Smartphones have become an integral part of our lives, but few of us think about the complex software that powers them, especially the cellular baseband – the processor on the device responsible for handling all cellular communication (such as LTE, 4G, and 5G). Most smartphones use cellular baseband processors with tight performance constraints, making security hardening difficult. Security researchers have increasingly exploited this attack vector and routinely demonstrated the possibility of exploiting basebands used in popular smartphones.

The good news is that Pixel has been deploying security hardening mitigations in our basebands for years, and Pixel 9 represents the most hardened baseband we’ve shipped yet. Below, we’ll dive into why this is so important, how specifically we’ve improved security, and what this means for our users.

The Cellular Baseband

The cellular baseband within a smartphone is responsible for managing the device’s connectivity to cellular networks. This function inherently involves processing external inputs, which may originate from untrusted sources. For instance, malicious actors can employ false base stations to inject fabricated or manipulated network packets. In certain protocols like IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem), this can be executed remotely from any global location using an IMS client.

The firmware within the cellular baseband, similar to any software, is susceptible to bugs and errors. In the context of the baseband, these software vulnerabilities pose a significant concern due to the heightened exposure of this component within the device’s attack surface. There is ample evidence demonstrating the exploitation of software bugs in modem basebands to achieve remote code execution, highlighting the critical risk associated with such vulnerabilities.

The State of Baseband Security

Baseband security has emerged as a prominent area of research, with demonstrations of software bug exploitation featuring in numerous security conferences. Many of these conferences now also incorporate training sessions dedicated to baseband firmware emulation, analysis, and exploitation techniques.

Recent reports by security researchers have noted that most basebands lack exploit mitigations commonly deployed elsewhere and considered best practices in software development. Mature software hardening techniques that are commonplace in the Android operating system, for example, are often absent from cellular firmwares of many popular smartphones.

There are clear indications that exploit vendors and cyber-espionage firms abuse these vulnerabilities to breach the privacy of individuals without their consent. For example, 0-day exploits in the cellular baseband are being used to deploy the Predator malware in smartphones. Additionally, exploit marketplaces explicitly list baseband exploits, often with relatively low payouts, suggesting a potential abundance of such vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to a device, execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or extract sensitive information.

Recognizing these industry trends, Android and Pixel have proactively updated their Vulnerability Rewards Program in recent years, placing a greater emphasis on identifying and addressing exploitable bugs in connectivity firmware.

Building a Fortress: Proactive Defenses in the Pixel Modem

In response to the rising threat of baseband security attacks, Pixel has incrementally incorporated many of the following proactive defenses over the years, with the Pixel 9 phones (Pixel 9, Pixel 9 Pro, Pixel 9 Pro XL and Pixel 9 Pro Fold) showcasing the latest features:

  • Bounds Sanitizer: Buffer overflows occur when a bug in code allows attackers to cram too much data into a space, causing it to spill over and potentially corrupt other data or execute malicious code. Bounds Sanitizer automatically adds checks around a specific subset of memory accesses to ensure that code does not access memory outside of designated areas, preventing memory corruption.
  • Integer Overflow Sanitizer: Numbers matter, and when they get too large an “overflow” can cause them to be incorrectly interpreted as smaller values. The reverse can happen as well, a number can overflow in the negative direction as well and be incorrectly interpreted as a larger value. These overflows can be exploited by attackers to cause unexpected behavior. Integer Overflow Sanitizer adds checks around these calculations to eliminate the risk of memory corruption from this class of vulnerabilities.
  • Stack Canaries: Stack canaries are like tripwires set up to ensure code executes in the expected order. If a hacker tries to exploit a vulnerability in the stack to change the flow of execution without being mindful of the canary, the canary “trips,” alerting the system to a potential attack.
  • Control Flow Integrity (CFI): Similar to stack canaries, CFI makes sure code execution is constrained along a limited number of paths. If an attacker tries to deviate from the allowed set of execution paths, CFI causes the modem to restart rather than take the unallowed execution path.
  • Auto-Initialize Stack Variables: When memory is designated for use, it’s not normally initialized in C/C+ as it is expected the developer will correctly set up the allocated region. When a developer fails to handle this correctly, the uninitialized values can leak sensitive data or be manipulated by attackers to gain code execution. Pixel phones automatically initialize stack variables to zero, preventing this class of vulnerabilities for stack data.

We also leverage a number of bug detection tools, such as address sanitizer, during our testing process. This helps us identify software bugs and patch them prior to shipping devices to our users.

The Pixel Advantage: Combining Protections for Maximum Security

Security hardening is difficult and our work is never done, but when these security measures are combined, they significantly increase Pixel 9’s resilience to baseband attacks.

Pixel’s proactive approach to security demonstrates a commitment to protecting its users across the entire software stack. Hardening the cellular baseband against remote attacks is just one example of how Pixel is constantly working to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to security.

Special thanks to our colleagues who supported our cellular baseband hardening efforts: Dominik Maier, Shawn Yang, Sami Tolvanen, Pirama Arumuga Nainar, Stephen Hines, Kevin Deus, Xuan Xing, Eugene Rodionov, Stephan Somogyi, Wes Johnson, Suraj Harjani, Morgan Shen, Valery Wu, Clint Chen, Cheng-Yi He, Estefany Torres, Hungyen Weng, Jerry Hung, Sherif Hanna

Android’s use of safe-by-design principles drives our adoption of memory-safe languages like Rust, making exploitation of the OS increasingly difficult with every release. To provide a secure foundation, we’re extending hardening and the use of memory-safe languages to low-level firmware (including in Trusty apps).

In this blog post, we’ll show you how to gradually introduce Rust into your existing firmware, prioritizing new code and the most security-critical code. You’ll see how easy it is to boost security with drop-in Rust replacements, and we’ll even demonstrate how the Rust toolchain can handle specialized bare-metal targets.

Drop-in Rust replacements for C code are not a novel idea and have been used in other cases, such as librsvg’s adoption of Rust which involved replacing C functions with Rust functions in-place. We seek to demonstrate that this approach is viable for firmware, providing a path to memory-safety in an efficient and effective manner.

Memory Safety for Firmware

Firmware serves as the interface between hardware and higher-level software. Due to the lack of software security mechanisms that are standard in higher-level software, vulnerabilities in firmware code can be dangerously exploited by malicious actors. Modern phones contain many coprocessors responsible for handling various operations, and each of these run their own firmware. Often, firmware consists of large legacy code bases written in memory-unsafe languages such as C or C++. Memory unsafety is the leading cause of vulnerabilities in Android, Chrome, and many other code bases.

Rust provides a memory-safe alternative to C and C++ with comparable performance and code size. Additionally it supports interoperability with C with no overhead. The Android team has discussed Rust for bare-metal firmware previously, and has developed training specifically for this domain.

Incremental Rust Adoption

Our incremental approach focusing on replacing new and highest risk existing code (for example, code which processes external untrusted input) can provide maximum security benefits with the least amount of effort. Simply writing any new code in Rust reduces the number of new vulnerabilities and over time can lead to a reduction in the number of outstanding vulnerabilities.

You can replace existing C functionality by writing a thin Rust shim that translates between an existing Rust API and the C API the codebase expects. The C API is replicated and exported by the shim for the existing codebase to link against. The shim serves as a wrapper around the Rust library API, bridging the existing C API and the Rust API. This is a common approach when rewriting or replacing existing libraries with a Rust alternative.

Challenges and Considerations

There are several challenges you need to consider before introducing Rust to your firmware codebase. In the following section we address the general state of no_std Rust (that is, bare-metal Rust code), how to find the right off-the-shelf crate (a rust library), porting an std crate to no_std, using Bindgen to produce FFI bindings, how to approach allocators and panics, and how to set up your toolchain.

The Rust Standard Library and Bare-Metal Environments

Rust’s standard library consists of three crates: core, alloc, and std. The core crate is always available. The alloc crate requires an allocator for its functionality. The std crate assumes a full-blown operating system and is commonly not supported in bare-metal environments. A third-party crate indicates it doesn’t rely on std through the crate-level #![no_std] attribute. This crate is said to be no_std compatible. The rest of the blog will focus on these.

Choosing a Component to Replace

When choosing a component to replace, focus on self-contained components with robust testing. Ideally, the components functionality can be provided by an open-source implementation readily available which supports bare-metal environments.

Parsers which handle standard and commonly used data formats or protocols (such as, XML or DNS) are good initial candidates. This ensures the initial effort focuses on the challenges of integrating Rust with the existing code base and build system rather than the particulars of a complex component and simplifies testing. This approach eases introducing more Rust later on.

Choosing a Pre-Existing Crate (Rust Library)

Picking the right open-source crate (Rust library) to replace the chosen component is crucial. Things to consider are:

  • Is the crate well maintained, for example, are open issues being addressed and does it use recent crate versions?

  • How widely used is the crate? This may be used as a quality signal, but also important to consider in the context of using crates later on which may depend on it.

  • Does the crate have acceptable documentation?

  • Does it have acceptable test coverage?

Additionally, the crate should ideally be no_std compatible, meaning the standard library is either unused or can be disabled. While a wide range of no_std compatible crates exist, others do not yet support this mode of operation – in those cases, see the next section on converting a std library to no_std.

By convention, crates which optionally support no_std will provide an std feature to indicate whether the standard library should be used. Similarly, the alloc feature usually indicates using an allocator is optional.

Note: Even when a library declares #![no_std] in its source, there is no guarantee that its dependencies don’t depend on std. We recommend looking through the dependency tree to ensure that all dependencies support no_std, or test whether the library compiles for a no_std target. The only way to know is currently by trying to compile the crate for a bare-metal target.

For example, one approach is to run cargo check with a bare-metal toolchain provided through rustup:

$ rustup target add aarch64-unknown-none

$ cargo check –target aarch64-unknown-none –no-default-features

Porting a std Library to no_std

If a library does not support no_std, it might still be possible to port it to a bare-metal environment – especially file format parsers and other OS agnostic workloads. Higher-level functionality such as file handling, threading, and async code may present more of a challenge. In those cases, such functionality can be hidden behind feature flags to still provide the core functionality in a no_std build.

To port a std crate to no_std (core+alloc):

  • In the cargo.toml file, add a std feature, then add this std feature to the default features

  • Add the following lines to the top of the lib.rs:

#![no_std]

#[cfg(feature = “std”)]

extern crate std;

extern crate alloc;

Then, iteratively fix all occurring compiler errors as follows:

  1. Move any use directives from std to either core or alloc.

  2. Add use directives for all types that would otherwise automatically be imported by the std prelude, such as alloc::vec::Vec and alloc::string::String.

  3. Hide anything that doesn’t exist in core or alloc and cannot otherwise be supported in the no_std build (such as file system accesses) behind a #[cfg(feature = std)] guard.

  4. Anything that needs to interact with the embedded environment may need to be explicitly handled, such as functions for I/O. These likely need to be behind a #[cfg(not(feature = “std”))] guard.

  5. Disable std for all dependencies (that is, change their definitions in Cargo.toml, if using Cargo).

This needs to be repeated for all dependencies within the crate dependency tree that do not support no_std yet.

Custom Target Architectures

There are a number of officially supported targets by the Rust compiler, however, many bare-metal targets are missing from that list. Thankfully, the Rust compiler lowers to LLVM IR and uses an internal copy of LLVM to lower to machine code. Thus, it can support any target architecture that LLVM supports by defining a custom target.

Defining a custom target requires a toolchain built with the channel set to dev or nightly. Rust’s Embedonomicon has a wealth of information on this subject and should be referred to as the source of truth. 

To give a quick overview, a custom target JSON file can be constructed by finding a similar supported target and dumping the JSON representation:

$ rustc print targetlist

[…]

armv7anoneeabi

[…]

$ rustc Z unstableoptions print targetspecjson target armv7anoneeabi

This will print out a target JSON that looks something like:

$ rustc print targetspecjson Z unstableoptions target=armv7anoneeabi

{

  “abi”: “eabi”,

  “arch”: “arm”,

  “c-enum-min-bits”: 8,

  “crt-objects-fallback”: “false”,

  “data-layout”: “e-m:e-p:32:32-Fi8-i64:64-v128:64:128-a:0:32-n32-S64”,

  […]

}

This output can provide a starting point for defining your target. Of particular note, the data-layout field is defined in the LLVM documentation.

Once the target is defined, libcore and liballoc (and libstd, if applicable) must be built from source for the newly defined target. If using Cargo, building with -Z build-std accomplishes this, indicating that these libraries should be built from source for your target along with your crate module:

# set build-std to the list of libraries needed

cargo build Z buildstd=core,alloc target my_target.json

Building Rust With LLVM Prebuilts

If the bare-metal architecture is not supported by the LLVM bundled internal to the Rust toolchain, a custom Rust toolchain can be produced with any LLVM prebuilts that support the target.

The instructions for building a Rust toolchain can be found in detail in the Rust Compiler Developer Guide. In the config.toml, llvm-config must be set to the path of the LLVM prebuilts.

You can find the latest Rust Toolchain supported by a particular version of LLVM by checking the release notes and looking for releases which bump up the minimum supported LLVM version. For example, Rust 1.76 bumped the minimum LLVM to 16 and 1.73 bumped the minimum LLVM to 15. That means with LLVM15 prebuilts, the latest Rust toolchain that can be built is 1.75.

Creating a Drop-In Rust Shim

To create a drop-in replacement for the C/C++ function or API being replaced, the shim needs two things: it must provide the same API as the replaced library and it must know how to run in the firmware’s bare-metal environment.

Exposing the Same API

The first is achieved by defining a Rust FFI interface with the same function signatures.

We try to keep the amount of unsafe Rust as minimal as possible by putting the actual implementation in a safe function and exposing a thin wrapper type around.

For example, the FreeRTOS coreJSON example includes a JSON_Validate C function with the following signature:

JSONStatus_t JSON_Validate( const char * buf, size_t max );

We can write a shim in Rust between it and the memory safe serde_json crate to expose the C function signature. We try to keep the unsafe code to a minimum and call through to a safe function early:

#[no_mangle]

pub unsafe extern “C” fn JSON_Validate(buf: *const c_char, len: usize) -> JSONStatus_t {

    if buf.is_null() {

        JSONStatus::JSONNullParameter as _

    } else if len == 0 {

        JSONStatus::JSONBadParameter as _

    } else {

        json_validate(slice_from_raw_parts(buf as _, len).as_ref().unwrap()) as _

    }

}

// No more unsafe code in here.

fn json_validate(buf: &[u8]) -> JSONStatus {

    if serde_json::from_slice::<Value>(buf).is_ok() {

        JSONStatus::JSONSuccess

    } else {

        ILLEGAL_DOC

    }

}

Note: This is a very simple example. For a highly resource constrained target, you can avoid alloc and use serde_json_core, which has even lower overhead but requires pre-defining the JSON structure so it can be allocated on the stack.

For further details on how to create an FFI interface, the Rustinomicon covers this topic extensively.

Calling Back to C/C++ Code

In order for any Rust component to be functional within a C-based firmware, it will need to call back into the C code for things such as allocations or logging. Thankfully, there are a variety of tools available which automatically generate Rust FFI bindings to C. That way, C functions can easily be invoked from Rust.

The standard means of doing this is with the Bindgen tool. You can use Bindgen to parse all relevant C headers that define the functions Rust needs to call into. It’s important to invoke Bindgen with the same CFLAGS as the code in question is built with, to ensure that the bindings are generated correctly.

Experimental support for producing bindings to static inline functions is also available.

Hooking Up The Firmware’s Bare-Metal Environment

Next we need to hook up Rust panic handlers, global allocators, and critical section handlers to the existing code base. This requires producing definitions for each of these which call into the existing firmware C functions.

The Rust panic handler must be defined to handle unexpected states or failed assertions. A custom panic handler can be defined via the panic_handler attribute. This is specific to the target and should, in most cases, either point to an abort function for the current task/process, or a panic function provided by the environment.

If an allocator is available in the firmware and the crate relies on the alloc crate, the Rust allocator can be hooked up by defining a global allocator implementing GlobalAlloc.

If the crate in question relies on concurrency, critical sections will need to be handled. Rust’s core or alloc crates do not directly provide a means for defining this, however the critical_section crate is commonly used to handle this functionality for a number of architectures, and can be extended to support more.

It can be useful to hook up functions for logging as well. Simple wrappers around the firmware’s existing logging functions can expose these to Rust and be used in place of print or eprint and the like. A convenient option is to implement the Log trait.

Fallible Allocations and alloc

Rusts alloc crate normally assumes that allocations are infallible (that is, memory allocations won’t fail). However due to memory constraints this isn’t true in most bare-metal environments. Under normal circumstances Rust panics and/or aborts when an allocation fails; this may be acceptable behavior for some bare-metal environments, in which case there are no further considerations when using alloc.

If there’s a clear justification or requirement for fallible allocations however, additional effort is required to ensure that either allocations can’t fail or that failures are handled. 

One approach is to use a crate that provides statically allocated fallible collections, such as the heapless crate, or dynamic fallible allocations like fallible_vec. Another is to exclusively use try_* methods such as Vec::try_reserve, which check if the allocation is possible.

Rust is in the process of formalizing better support for fallible allocations, with an experimental allocator in nightly allowing failed allocations to be handled by the implementation. There is also the unstable cfg flag for alloc called no_global_oom_handling which removes the infallible methods, ensuring they are not used.

Build Optimizations

Building the Rust library with LTO is necessary to optimize for code size. The existing C/C++ code base does not need to be built with LTO when passing -C lto=true to rustc. Additionally, setting -C codegen-unit=1 results in further optimizations in addition to reproducibility. 

If using Cargo to build, the following Cargo.toml settings are recommended to reduce the output library size:

[profile.release]

panic = “abort”

lto = true

codegen-units = 1

strip = “symbols”

# opt-level “z” may produce better results in some circumstances

opt-level = “s” 

Passing the -Z remap-cwd-prefix=. flag to rustc or to Cargo via the RUSTFLAGS env var when building with Cargo to strip cwd path strings.

In terms of performance, Rust demonstrates similar performance to C. The most relevant example may be the Rust binder Linux kernel driver, which found “that Rust binder has similar performance to C binder”.

When linking LTO’d Rust staticlibs together with C/C++, it’s recommended to ensure a single Rust staticlib ends up in the final linkage, otherwise there may be duplicate symbol errors when linking. This may mean combining multiple Rust shims into a single static library by re-exporting them from a wrapper module.

Memory Safety for Firmware, Today

Using the process outlined in this blog post, You can begin to introduce Rust into large legacy firmware code bases immediately. Replacing security critical components with off-the-shelf open-source memory-safe implementations and developing new features in a memory safe language will lead to fewer critical vulnerabilities while also providing an improved developer experience.

Special thanks to our colleagues who have supported and contributed to these efforts: Roger Piqueras Jover, Stephan Chen, Gil Cukierman, Andrew Walbran, and Erik Gilling